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Scientific studies show that genetically modified organisms
("GMOs") have an adverse impact on biodiversity, especially
pollinating species. Enforcement of the laws regulating the
introduction of GMOs into the environment has not kept pace with
this finding. A Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework) of three federal agencies-
the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA")-regulates biotechnology in the
marketplace and the environment.' Under existing judicial
interpretation of the Coordinated Framework, a loophole exists.
With this loophole, none of these agencies are responsible for
assessing the cumulative environmental impacts of GMOs on the
biodiversity of endangered or threatened species. An analysis of
GMO regulation under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA")
suggests that this statute provides the best means to close this
loophole.
Under the ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FSW") must
assess and issue an opinion about the biological impacts of proposed
governmental action whenever that government action might
endanger the continued survival of an endangered species.2 This Note
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The
author would like to thank Professors David Takacs and Brian Gray.
1. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302
(June 26, 1986).
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (also referred to as "§ 7
consultation").
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posits that, since GMO deregulation impacts endangered pollinators,
the ESA mandates that the FWS evaluate the impact of GMOs on the
biodiversity of endangered pollinators. Since protection of these and
certain other endangered or threatened species improves agriculture,
which clearly affects interstate commerce, ESA's mandatory
consultation provision is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause. Thus, the regulation of GMOs under
the ESA is preferable to state and local attempts to regulate labeling
or ban GMOs. This is because this state action arguably impacts
interstate commerce by discriminating against the free flow of
products into the state. Unlike state and local efforts to regulate
labeling or banning of GMOs, the ESA's mandatory § 7 consultation
provision is not subject to constitutional Commerce Clause
challenges. Furthermore, due to the adverse impact that GMOs have
on endangered species, state and local deregulation of GMOs directly
conflicts with the purpose and enforcement of the ESA, and thus the
ESA preempts such deregulation.
This Note consists of seven sections aimed at showing the
shortcomings of GMO regulation with respect to protecting
endangered pollinators. This Note also shows how the ESA requires
evaluation of the biodiversity impacts from GMOs for the overall
effectiveness of the ESA's regulatory scheme. Section I discusses
what GMOs are and their prevalence in agriculture. Section II
explains the current Coordinated Framework approach to
deregulation of GMOs and how the existing GMO regulatory
framework fails to protect biodiversity. Section III addresses the
impacts of GMOs on endangered pollinators. Section IV presents the
scientific evidence showing that GMOs threaten the continued
survival of endangered pollinating species. Section V examines the
only Supreme Court decision, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,3
reviewing deregulation of GMOs for their impacts on the
environment and biodiversity. Section VI discusses the ESA as
preempting state law (and therefore avoiding dormant Commerce
Clause issues) under the Supremacy Clause. Section VII discusses
ESA regulation under both the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause.
3. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
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I. Overview of GMOs
In 2011, the Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO") of the
United Nations ("UN") found that seventy-five percent "of the
Earth's plant genetic diversity has been lost since 1900 as farmers
shift to genetically uniform, mass-produced crop varieties.",4  The
World Health Organization defines genetically modified organisms
("GMOs") as "organisms (i.e., plants, animals or microorganisms) in
which the genetic material ("DNA") has been altered in a way that
does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination."5
Dubbed "modern biotechnology," "genetic engineering" ("GE"), or
"GM foods,"6 the process "allows selected individual genes to be
transferred from one organism into another, also between non-
related species.",
7
Regulatory agencies do not consider the means of production in
assessing crop differences; rather, agencies consider GMOs the
substantial equivalent of their natural counterparts, due to their
similar phenotypic expression.' Thus, the Coordinated Framework
advocates that genetic modification is innocuous: If it looks like an
apple and tastes like an apple, then it is an apple.9 Since 1996,
herbicide-tolerant and insecticide-resistant GMO strains have been
the only types of GMOs on the market in the United States.°
Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt) crops contain DNA from the Bt
bacterium, which codes for proteins that kill insects that ingest Bt
4. Deniza Gertsberg, Loss of Biodiversity and Genetically Modified Crops, GMO J.
(June 17, 2011), http://gmo-journal.com/2011/06/17/loss-of-biodiversity-and-genetically-
modified-crops/.




8. Phenotypic expression is the physical, genetic expression of an organism; whereas
a genotype describes the actual genetic makeup of an organism, whether or not a
particular gene is physically expressed in that organism.
9. Stephen Tan & Brian Epley, Much Ado About Something: The First Amendment
and Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods, 89 WASH. L. REV. 301, 306
(2014).
10. JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES,. 5-6, (Feb. 2014) (The USDA has
approved field releases of other kinds of GE crops for testing, such as drought resistant
varieties, but these have not gained market approval.), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/
1282246/err162.pdf.
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crops' plant tissue.1  Herbicide-tolerant GMOs enable farmers to
spray herbicides to eliminate weeds, without affecting the genetically
modified (GM) crop.2
Crops created from biotechnology cover 100 times more surface
area than when they were first planted in 1996: from 1.7 million
hectares to over 175 million hectares.3 Almost half of the world's
soybeans and a third of its corn are biotech produced4 The United
States leads the world in GM crop production.5 Industry developers
of GMOs assert that GMOs protect the environment because they
include a component that is either tolerant to herbicides or produces
pesticidal compounds, thereby reducing the use of pesticides and
herbicides in agriculture.6 However, since the introduction of GM
crops in 1996, pesticide use increased by an estimated 404 million
pounds or by about seven percent." Studies show that the
introduction of GMOs into the agricultural system actually increases
the use of toxic chemicals and negatively impacts the biodiversity of
nontarget organisms, including those listed as endangered or
threatened to be endangered8
II. The Coordinated Framework Approach to
Deregulation of GMOs
The Coordinated Framework views genetically engineered
organisms as the substantial equivalent of organisms produced by
natural processes. This approach to regulation, known as the
11. Jong Yul Roh et al., Bacillus thuringiensis as a Specific, Safe, and Effective Tool
for Insect Pest Control, 17 J. MICROBIOLOGY BIOTECH. 547, 553-54 (2007).
12. Herbicide Resistant Crops, GMO Compass (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/agri-biotechnology/breeding-aims/146.herbicide-resistant-crops.html.
13. Clive James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2013, INT'L
SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH 1, 1 (2013), http://www.isaaa.org/
resources/publications/briefs/46/executivesummary/pdf/Brief%2046%20-%2OExecutive%
20Summary%20-%20English.pdf.
14. Michael Specter, Seeds of Doubt: An Activist's Controversial Crusade Against
Genetically Modified Crops, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 25, 2014, at 46.
15. James, supra note 13, at 3.
16. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 5.
17. Charles M. Benbrook, Impacts of Genetically Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use
in the U.S., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES EUROPE 1, 3 (2012), http://www.enveurope.com/
content/pdf/2190-4715-24-24.pdf.
18. See Lora A. Morandin & Mark L. Winston, Wild Bee Abundance and Seed
Production in Conventional, Organic, and Genetically Modified Canola, 15 ECOL.
APPLICATIONS 871, 876-77 (2005) for a more in depth discussion of the correlation
between wild bee populations and pollination deficits in GM agricultural plots as
compared to conventional and organic plots.
[Vol. 43:1
substantial equivalence principle, enables the Coordinated
Framework to regulate all organisms the same way, regardless of
whether the process creating that organism was natural or through
genetic engineering. The substantial equivalence principle
essentially is a "safe until proven otherwise" theory, which allows the
"approval of new products that are substantially equivalent to natural
ones in the absence of significant adverse effects on production and
consumption.'"2 ° The FDA may issue regulations to restrict market-
release of GMOs if there is an adverse effect on human health from
consumption.2' The EPA only has jurisdiction over a GMO when that
GMO contains pesticide-producing genetic material and must permit
GMO introduction as long as the specific chemical compounds of the
encoded pesticide do not adversely impact human health and the
environment.2' The USDA must deregulate a GMO in the absence of
a plant-pest risk.' In determining the presence of adverse effects on
production and consumption, agencies rely on the scientific evidence1 4
set forth by the applicant. Once the GMO is approved for
19. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302
(June 26, 1986).
20. Katherine Wilinska, Note, AquAdvantage is Not Real Advantage: European
Biotechnology Regulations and the United States' September 2010 FDA Review of
Genetically Modified Salmon, 21 MINN. J. INT'L L. 145, 152-53 (2012).
21. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA's Role in Regulating Safety of GE Foods 1, 3
(May 9, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM35
2193.pdf.
22. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (2014); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA's
Regulation of Biotechnology for Use in Pest Management (May 14, 2014), http://www.epa.
gov/pesticides/biopesticides/reg-of biotech/eparegofbiotech.htm.
23. 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2012); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1006,
1018 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that USDA-APHIS interpretation of the Plant Protection
Act was entitled to deference: namely, that in the absence of a plant-pest risk, APHIS
does not have regulatory authority to continue managing GMOs); ANIMAL & PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., Petitions, U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., https://www.aphis.usda.
gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/sa-permits-notifications-and-petitions
(follow "Petitions" hyperlink) (last modified Aug. 3, 2015).
24. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Biotechnology: Genetically Engineered Plants for
Food & Feed, http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearchfBiotechnology/default.htm
(last updated May 6, 2015) (The FDA "require[s] developers submit a scientific and
regulatory assessment of the bioengineered food 120 days before the bioengineered food
is marketed" and the FDA "recommends that developers continue the practice of
consulting with the agency.") (emphasis added); ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION
SERV., Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https://www.aphis.usda
.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfcus/biotechnology/sa-permits-notifications-and-petitions (last
modified Aug. 3, 2015) (APHIS-USDA deregulates GMOs "[w]hen a developer has
collected enough evidence that a GE organism poses no more of a plant pest risk that an
equivalent non-GE organism.") (emphasis added); U.S. LIBRARY OF CONG., Restrictions
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deregulation, the regulatory agency ceases oversight of the
introduced GMO.25 This lack of oversight means there is no required
review or measurement of the impact of the approved, i.e.,
deregulated, GMOs on biodiversity after deregulation.6
Though the USDA claims it works with the EPA to determine
the environmental risks from a proposed new GMO, such as impacts
on nontarget species," both agencies operate under the assumption
that "potential risks associated with [GM] organisms fall into the
same general categories as those created by traditionally bred
organisms."' This substantial equivalence approach is fundamentally
at odds with effective regulation of biodiversity threats: where GMOs
are assumed to pose the same risks as other crops, an agency does not
have to look at the indirect effects on biodiversity unique to GMOs;
where oversight completely ceases with the deregulation of GMOs,
an agency does not have to look at the cumulative environmental
effects over time.9
While the Coordinated Framework claims it regulates GMOs for
their safety regarding health, the environment, and agriculture, all
three agencies approve GMOs for deregulation based on information
presented by the industry applicant and stop oversight cases once
on Genetically Modified Organisms: United States, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions
-on-gmos/usa.php (last updated June 9, 2015) (EPA requires that pesticides be registered
before commercial distribution and "[p]esticides must be tested and shown to be safe
before they can be registered." Therefore, "[a] registration application must include
information regarding testing, identity of the product, draft labeling, information on
tolerance of residues, and other safety-related information." Further, "if the producer of
the [GMO] obtains information regarding adverse effects from the [GMO] on human
health or the environment, it must share it with the EPA.") (emphasis added).
25. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=AGRICULTURE&contentid=Bi
otechnologyFAQs.xml (last modified May 15, 2015) ("6. What are the roles of government
in agricultural biotechnology?").
26. An approved GMO is the same as a deregulated GMO-agencies "approve" a
GMO for "deregulation."
27. An impact on a "nontarget" organism means that, while the organism was not the
intentional "target" of the product (GMO, pesticide, etc.), the organism was nonetheless
affected by that product.
28. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 25.
29. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23302 (June 26, 1986) (The process for deregulation of GMOs and for the approval of
their subsequent release into the environment depends on the presence of pesticidal
compounds. The EPA oversees the permitting process for these organisms along with
APHIS; if the GMO does not produce pesticidal compounds, then APHIS regulates its
release into the environment.).
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they decide to deregulate.30 The substantial equivalence doctrine,
which is the foundation of the United States GMO regulatory system,
is antithetical to the protections that the Coordinated Framework
promises. If the priority is human and environmental safety, rather
than the fastest method to introduce consumer goods on the market,
the United States must take a fundamentally different approach to
GMO regulation. Regulators should not give GMO manufacturers
the benefit of the doubt when GMOs have uncertain and wide-
reaching impacts.
III. Species Surveys and Policy Trends Support the Unfortunate
Truth That Pollinating Species Are on the Brink of Extinction
The world is currently in the sixth mass extinction: we have
already exceeded the number of extinctions that occurred in the
previous five mass extinctions.31 Normally, a thirty percent decline in
the number of species occurs once every ten million years, but over
forty percent of all species evaluated by the International Union for
Conservation of Nature ("IUCN") are currently threatened with
extinction.32 This species decline is directly impacting agricultural
outputs. The world is facing a "bee-pocalypse" where honey bees-
nature's primary pollinators, which enable the production of at least
ninety commercially grown crops in America-have been dying off en
masse.33 Pollinators assist over eighty percent of the world's flowering
plants and contribute more than $24 billion to the U.S. economy-of
which honey bees account for $15 billion and native insect pollination
contributes $9 billion.T Fruit and seed production require animal
pollination, primarily from bees, for one or more cultivars of seventy
percent of the world's 1300 crops.35 A combination of stressors
contribute to the bee disappearance and pollinator-extinction more
generally, including loss of natural forage and inadequate diet, habitat
30. See Tan & Epley, supra note 9, at 304.
31. MARTHA GROOM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 86 (Sinauer
Associates, Inc. 3rd ed. 2005).
32. Id.
33. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, Fact Sheet: The Economic Challenge Posed by
Declining Pollinator Populations, THE WHITE HOUSE 1, 1 (June 20, 2014), http://www.
fs.fed.us/widfowers/pol linators/documents/PresMemoJune2l4/PolIinatorFactSheet-Pres
Memo.pdf.
34. ld.; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Pollinators: Our Future Flies on the Wings of
Pollinators, http://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/pollinators/index.shtmI (last visited Sept. 17,
2015).
35. GROOM ET AL., supra note 31, at 54.
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loss, modification, and fragmentation, agricultural and grazing
practices, pesticide use, loss of genetic diversity, agricultural practices
and pesticides and herbicides.36
Pollinators include a diverse array of organisms, primarily ants,
bats, bees, beetles, birds, butterflies, flies, moths, and wasps.37 Many
of these pollinators are endangered or threatened, but declines in
insect species often get overlooked due to their small size and
culturally abhorrent reputation.38 The Red List of Pollinator Insects
of North America names dozens of butterflies and bees that are facing
significant threats of endangerment, and the world is seeing increased
population declines in native pollinators, such as bumble bees, as well
as migrating species, such as Monarch Butterflies.3 9  Pollinators
federally listed as endangered or threatened include the Bay
Checkerspot butterfly, the Dehli Sands Flower-loving fly, and the
Valley Elderberry Longhorn Beetle.' Over 30 species of bees are
critically imperiled and possibly extinct, including Franklin's bumble
bee and several yellow-faced bees.4' While the FWS has not formally
listed any bee-species as endangered, it nonetheless recognizes the
need to. For instance, in 2011, the Pacific Islands Office of the Fish
and Wildlife Service found that seven species of yellow-faced
Hawaiian bees warranted listing as an endangered species and the
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Office found that the Franklin's bumble
bee also warranted listing as an endangered species.42 The FWS is still
36. Fish and Wildlife Service, Pollinators in Decline - Causes http://www.esa.org/
ecoservices/poll/body.poll.scie.decl.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014); Office of the Press
Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Economic Challenge Posed by Declining Pollinator Populations,
THE WHITE HOUSE 1, 1 (June 20, 2014), http://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/pollinators/
documents/PresMemoJune20l4/PollinatorFactSheet-PresMemo.pdf.
37. United States Department of Agriculture, Our Future Flies on the Wings of
Pollinators http://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/pollinators/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
38. Fish and Wildlife Service, Pollinators in Decline - Causes http://www.esa.org/
ecoservices/poll/body.poll.scie.decl.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
39. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Pollinators: Endangered Species
Program http://www.fws.gov/pollinators/Programs/Endangered.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2014) (lists endangered and threatened pollinators); Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet: The Economic Challenge Posed by Declining Pollinator Populations, THE WHITE
HOUSE 1, 1 (June 20, 2014), http://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/pollinators/documents/Pres
Memo June2014/PollinatorFactSheet-PresMemo.pdf.
40. Pollinators: Endangered Species Program, supra note 39.
41. The Xerces Society for Invertebrate Conservation, Red List of Bees: Native Bees
in Decline http://www.xerces.org/pollinator-redlist/# (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
42. Pacific Islands Fish and Wildlife Office, News Release: Endangered Species
Listing Warranted for 7 Species of Hawaiian Yellow-faced Bees, UNITED STATES FISH
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considering these bee species for listing. The National Resources
Defense Council and Xerces Society sued the FWS to list the rusty
patched bumble bee in 2014, and the suit is pending.43 Hundreds of
vertebrate pollinator species are also on the verge of extinction (at
least fifteen are endangered).44 Scientists are already seeing cascade
effects (i.e., one species extinction causing secondary extinctions in
other dependent species) resulting from pollinator-endangerment and
presume these effects will be devastating and irreparable if they
persist.45  President Obama's recent directive "Creating a Federal
Strategy to Promote the Health of Honey Bees and Other
Pollinators" requires numerous agencies to prioritize the
conservation of pollinators.46 The agricultural industry, GE industry,
and the world, cannot underestimate the importance of pollination as
an ecosystem service and the implications of its decline. Though the
agricultural industry has felt the economic impacts resulting from a
decline in pollination services, GMOs, which threaten the survival of
pollinating species, have gained popularity.
IV. Adverse Effects of GMOs: The Scientific Evidence of GMO
Impact on Pollinators
While some in the scientific community dispute that GMOs have
a direct adverse impact on species, studies prove that GMOs have
indirect adverse effects on biodiversity.47 Biodiversity, i.e., biological
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE 1, 2 (Sep. 6, 2011), http://www.fws.gov/pacificislands/news%20
releases/Final%20News%20Release%20%2012%20month%20HI%2OYellow-
faced%20bees%20090611.pdf.
43. Mica Rosenberg, Environmentalists sue to list bumble bee as endangered,
REUTERS (May 13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/us-usa-environment-
bees-idUSKBNODT21F20140513.
44. Fish and Wildlife Service, Pollinators in Decline-Causes http://www.esa.org/
ecoservices/poll/body.poll.scie.decl.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
45. Id.
46. Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Memorandum-Creating a Federal
Strategy to Promote the Health of Honey Bees and Other Pollinators, THE WHITE HOUSE
(June 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/20/presidential-
memorandum-creating-federal-strategy-promote-health-honey-b.
47. See Dirk S. Schmeller & Klaus Henle, Cultivation of genetically modified
organisms: resource needs for monitoring adverse effects on biodiversity, 17 BIODIVERSITY
& CONSERVATION 3551, 3553 (2008) (showing negative impacts of GMOs on habitat,
feeding, and predator-prey dynamics of keystone and at-risk i.e., endangered or
threatened or vulnerable species); Lora A. Morandin, Genetically Modified Crops: Effects
on Bees and Pollination, in BEE POLLINATION IN AGRICULTURAL ECOSYSTEMS 203, 207,
213 (R. James & T. Pitts-Singer eds., 2008) (direct lethal impacts on bees are difficult to
assess since there are thousands of species of bees and various potential genetic mutations
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diversity, "refers to the variety of living organisms, their genetic
diversity, the diversity of evolutionary lineages, and the types of
ecological communities into which they are assembled.,48  Less-
understood, sublethal effects could negatively impact bees more than
better-understood, lethal effects.49 Different gene expression might
lead to altered levels of nectar or floral appearance, both essential
attributes for attracting pollinators.0 The negative effects from GM
pollen could potentially implicate the mortality of other pollinators,
many species of which are listed for protection under the ESA.5
Increasingly, scientific research is unveiling the direct negative
impacts of transgenic crops on nontarget organisms and the cascading
effect that has on species necessary for pest control and maintenance
of ecological foodwebs. Studies on herbicide tolerant GM crops, for
example, show a decrease in nontarget arthropod biodiversity due to
a decrease in weedy habitat as a result of glyphosate application (an
herbicide).52  A decrease in weedy habitat also decreases seedling
abundance, which negatively impacts bird survival because birds
depend on seedlings for food.3 Weedy abundance can impact native
of GE pollen post-environmental release); P. Han, Quantification of toxins in a CrylAc +
CpTI cotton cultivar and its potential effects on the honey bee Apis mellifera L., 19
ECOTOXICOLOGY 1452, 1457 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC29
95320/ (showing the anti-feedant effects of GMOs on bees, disrupting feeding and foraging
patterns); Gunther Latsch, Collapsing Colonies: Are GM Crops Killing Bees?, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/collapsing-colonies-
are-gm-crops-killing-bees-a-473166.html (showing sublethal impacts effects on bees make
bees more susceptible to pathogens and disease); Matthias Schindler et al., Monitoring
agricultural ecosystems by using wild bees as environmental indicators, 8 BIoRISK 53, 59
(2013), available at http://biorisk.pensoft.net/articles.php?id=1899. (showing anti-feedant
effects result in a negative impact on viability of wild bee populations); Morandin &
Winston, supra note 18, at 876-77 (showing lower abundances of wild bee populations and
pollination deficits are found together in GM agricultural plots compared to conventional
and organic plots).
48. GROOM ET AL., supra note 31, at 60.
49. Id. at 206.
50. Id. at 210.
51. Pollinators: Endangered Species Program, supra note 39.
52. Osamu Imura et al., Assessing the effects of cultivating genetically modified
glyphosate-tolerant varieties of soy beans (Glycine max (L.) Merr.) on populations of field
arthropods, 9 ENVIRON. BIOSAFETY RES. 101, 108 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/21288465; AJ Haughton et al., Invertebrate responses to the management of
genetically modified herbicide-tolerant and conventional spring crops. II. Within-field
epigeal and aerial arthropods, 358 PHILOS. TRANS. R. Soc. LOND. B. BIo. SCI. 1863, 1872-
73, 1875 (2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693277/.
53. A.R. Watkinson et al., Predictions of Biodiversity Response to Genetically
Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, 289 SCIENCE 1554, 1556 (2000), http://nctc.fws.gov/
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bee populations, which tend to be greater in areas with greater plant
diversity and abundance." Despite these impacts, the only Supreme
Court opinion resulting from a line of cases addressing GMO impacts
on endangered species turned on the procedural requirements of an
injunction on GMOs, rather than the merits of GMO regulation
based on threats to endangered species.
V. Judicial Interpretation of GMO Regulation Under the ESA
The battle over Roundup Ready Alfalfa ("RRA") deregulation
remains the most pertinent legal controversy regarding judicial review
of GMOs and their impact on ecosystems. The seminal case
addressing RRA deregulation was the Supreme Court decision
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.55  In 2005, the USDA,
specifically the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
("APHIS"), granted Monsanto's petition to deregulate RRA, a
genetically engineered variety of alfalfa resistant to Monsanto's
Roundup herbicide (i.e., glyphosate).56 In so doing, APHIS warned
Monsanto in its Notice of approval that RRA "should not reduce the
ability to control pests and weeds in alfalfa or other crops."57 APHIS
issued a similar Notice in deregulating GE sugar beets.58
Deregulation of a GMO is an agency action that may adversely affect
the environment, and therefore, APHIS must follow the information-
forcing procedure, established by the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), in issuing deregulation.
NEPA requires federal agencies, such as APHIS, to prepare a
detailed EIS for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.'"5 9 NEPA ensures that an agency
will carefully consider impacts on the environment and will make
resources/course-resources/pesticides/GMOs/predictions-of-bidiversity-response-to-gmo-
watkinson-et-al-2000.pdf.
54. Supra note 138, at 210-11.
55. Mosanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010).
56. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Servs., Roundup Ready Alfalfa History, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/
biotechnology/sa.news/ctalfalfa history/! ut/p/aO/04_Sj9CPykssyOxPLMnMzOvMAfGjzO
K9_D2MDJOMjDzd3V2dDDz93HwCzL29jAyMTPULsh0VAU1Vels!I/.
57. Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability Determination of
Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide
Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,917, 36,918-19 (June 27,2005).
58. Monsanto Co. and KWS SAAT AG; Determination of Nonregulated Status for
Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 Fed.
Reg.13,007, 13,008 (Mar. 17, 2005).
59. 42 USC § 4332(2)(C).
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relevant information available to the public.60  The "threshold
question in a NEPA case is whether a proposed project will
'significantly affect' the environment, thereby triggering the
requirement for an EIS.",6' The agency must conduct an
Environmental Assessment to determine if an action may cause a
significant impact. If no significant impact is found, it must issue a
statement explaining its Finding Of No Significant Impact; if a
significant impact is found, the agency must conduct an EIS.62
The litigation battle in Geertson Seed Farms began with APHIS's
deregulation of RRA. In its 2005 Environmental Assessment,
APHIS found that RRA did not pose a significant plant-pest risk and
it was, therefore, "no longer considered regulated articles under 7
CFR part 340.' ,63 APHIS's Finding Of No Significant Impact in 2005
noted that once deregulated, RRA would not be subject to "isolation
distances," i.e., regulations would not require farmers to grow RRA
more than two miles away from conventional and organic alfalfa
crops.64 APHIS concluded that the risk of gene transmission was
insignificant because the organic farmer is responsible for ensuring
their crops avoid cross-pollination from neighboring operations.65 In
response to concerns about weed resistance, APHIS stated that while
RRA could lead to glyphosate-resistant weeds, farmers could use
other effective herbicides on the market for weed eradication, and
therefore, weed-resistance was not a significant impact necessitating
an EIS.
Organic and conventional farmers challenged the APHIS
decision to deregulate RRA.66 Plaintiffs asserted that there was a risk
of genetic contamination, i.e., pollen-drift.6 Neither of the parties
disputed the fact that insect pollination for alfalfa can occur at least
two miles from the pollen source.68 The district court determined that
60. See id.
61. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 (CRB), 2007 WL 518624, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13,2007).
62. Id. at *4.
63. Animal and Plant Inspection Services, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events JIQI
and J163: Request for Nonregulated Status, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE i, ii (Dec. 2010), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/wp-content/up
loads/2010/12/AlfalfaEIS.pdf (final EIS); Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *3.
64. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *2.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *1.
67. Id. at *2.
68. Id.
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due to bee pollination and the high geographic concentration of
alfalfa seed production, there is a realistic potential for gene
transmission to non-genetically engineered crops.
69  Once
contaminated, farmers are unable to eradicate or control the spread
of the Roundup Ready gene. Since alfalfa is a perennial crop, the
crop is only planted every 3-4 years.70 APHIS's Finding of No
Significant Impact determination relied solely on the conclusion that
organic and conventional farmers hold the responsibility to prevent
gene transmission-regardless of whether the farmers can actually
protect their crops from contamination.7"
Regarding Plaintiff's second contention that weed resistance
results from increased use of Roundup on crops, the court found
APHIS's response "cavalier": The mere existence of other methods
to eradicate weeds is irrelevant if farmers do not use those methods.
The court also determined that APHIS failed to evaluate the
cumulative impact of planting Roundup Ready crop varietals and
increased use of glyphosate.73 Thus, APHIS "did not take the 'hard
look' NEPA requires."74 The district court enjoined use of RRAs
until APHIS conducted an EIS.75 The court dismissed claims brought
under the ESA and PPA as premature because APHIS had to
produce an EIS before the court could adjudicate those claims.
76
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling; but the
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the district court abused its
discretion in issuing a nationwide permanent injunction on RRA
pending the completion of an EIS.77 The Supreme Court rejected
Monsanto's standing argument, reasoning that the Plaintiffs would
suffer sufficiently concrete harms to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of•7 1
the constitutional standing requirement.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *6.
72. Id. at *6, *10.
73. Id. at *9-10.
74. Id. at *10.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *12.
77. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010).
78. Id. at 155-57. The Court reiterated that in order to grant a permanent injunction
the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
17 11 9fll 1
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The Court, however, ruled that the district court's findings did
not meet the requirements for a permanent injunction because the
district court did not consider that APHIS had the option to partially
deregulate RRA pending EIS completion.9 In his dissent, Justice
Stevens asserted that the "Court ignore[d] the district court's findings
that gene flow is likely and that APHIS has little ability to monitor
any conditions imposed on a partial deregulation."'  Therefore,
Justice Stevens noted "the [district] court may have felt it especially
prudent to wait for an EIS before concluding that APHIS could
manage RRA's threat to the environment" and "the district court was
well within its discretion to order the remedy that the Court now
reverses."
8'
In 2011, APHIS completely deregulated RRA stating that
because it had not identified any plant pest risks associated with
RRA, APHIS did not have existing statutory authority to regulate
RRAs under a partial deregulation alternative (such as mandating
isolation distances and geographic restrictions to reduce risk of
transgenic contamination).2 However, "APHIS acknowledged that
full deregulation could lead to transgenic contamination through the
transfer of pollen or seed mixing, increased use of glyphosate, and the
evolution and proliferation of glyphosate-resistant weeds" and the
''no action alternative as the 'environmentally preferred
alternative."
83
In response to the deregulation, plaintiffs filed various claims
against the defendants under the Plant Protection Act, ESA, and
NEPA. The district court found that Congress did not intend for
"APHIS to regulate commercial crops as plant pests because they
pose a risk of transgenic contamination" in the Plant Protection Act.
The Plant Protection Act does not require APHIS "to consider the
effects of increased herbicide use or the development of herbicide
resistant weeds in making this assessment." Ultimately, the court
held that APHIS's interpretation of the Plant Protection Act was
entitled to deference; namely, that there was no plant pest risk, and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
79. Id. at 160.
80. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 184,185.
82. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1015, 1016.
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therefore APHIS did not have regulatory authority to continue to
manage RRAs under a partial deregulation scheme.85 Therefore, the
court dismissed Plaintiffs' NEPA claims, reasoning that APHIS took
a "hard look" at alternatives and mitigation measures, and that was
all that was required of the agency under NEPA."6
In so doing, the district court stated, "Plaintiffs' ESA claim
ultimately turns on whether APHIS's actions are the legally relevant
cause of increased glyphosate use."8 The district court stated that
"where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its
limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency
cannot be considered a legally relevant 'cause' of the effect" and that
a "'but for' causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency
responsible for a particular effect under NEPA.' .. The district court
held that "APHIS is not the legally relevant cause of the glyphosate
use complained of by Plaintiffs" since APHIS found no plant pest
risk, and APHIS only has jurisdiction when a plant pest risk exists.89
Because APHIS lacked "discretionary authority to regulate the crop"
it "could not be obligated to conduct additional ESA analysis." The
court further determined that Congress delegated that authority to
the EPA through Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act.' The court also expressed concerns about the EPA's exercise of
this power: "If Plaintiffs allegations are true, then it is disturbing that
EPA has yet to assess the effects of glyphosate on most of the species
found near the acreage on which RRA will be planted and glyphosate
will be used."9' Even though the EPA would not conduct a complete,
national EIS regarding RRA glyphosate use until 2015, the court did
not discuss this factor because EPA was not a party to the case." The
saga of alfalfa deregulation continued on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court opinion, explaining:
The ESA's requirements would come into play
only when an action results from an exercise of agency
discretion....
85. Id. at 1018.
86. See id. at 1022.
87. Id. at 1019.
88. Id. at 1019-20.
89. Id. at 1020.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1020-21.
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Here, once APHIS concluded that RRA was not
a plant pest because it did not cause plant pest injury
to plants, the agency had no jurisdiction to continue
regulating the crop. The agency's deregulation of
RRA was thus a nondiscretionary act that did not
trigger the agency's duty to consult under the ESA.93
Thus, at the moment, no federal agency is truly evaluating and
considering the impacts of GMOs on endangered or threatened
species and on the ecosystems upon which organisms depend.
Geertson Seed Farms is the only GMO lawsuit heard before the
Supreme Court whose legal claim derived, in part, from GMO
biodiversity impacts. The Supreme Court's ruling, however, only
addressed the district court's abuse of discretion in granting injunctive
relief; the Court did not rule on the merits of the ESA claim.94 On
remand, the lower court held that the USDA did not have jurisdiction
over glyphosate use (the EPA has jurisdiction), and, therefore,
APHIS does not have to consider such cumulative impacts in its
Environmental Assessments.9 The problem is that the EPA does not
have jurisdiction over plants-it only has jurisdiction over the
herbicidal and pesticidal compounds in the plant.96 The impact of the
district court's decision is that the EPA does not have to take into
account where and how many GMOs are planted in its
Environmental Assessments of herbicides because the EPA does not
have regulatory authority. Therefore, Environmental Assessments
conducted by both the USDA and the EPA are inherently flawed
because they do not take into account the cumulative impact of
herbicide-resistant GMO abundance with coinciding increases of
herbicide use. The best way to address this regulatory loophole is to
enforce a § 7 consultation with the FWS whereby the agency must
consider the adverse effect of such cumulative impacts on pollinators
and the continued survival of species essential to functioning
agroecosystems.
93. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted).
94. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010).
95. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
96. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C)-(c)(5)(D); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Is Anyone
Regulating? The Curious State of GMO Governance in the United States, 37 VT. L. REV.
923, 937 (2013).
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VI. The ESA § 7 Consultation Mandate and Deregulation of
GMOs: Preemption Under The Supremacy Clause
The first general recommendation in the Coordinate Framework
directive states that "[h]armonization of approaches to rDNA
technology can be facilitated by exchanging: principles or guidelines
for national regulations; developments in risk analysis; and practical
experience in risk management. Therefore, information should be
shared as freely as possible."'  The legislation underlying the
Coordinated Framework endorses the free flow of information,
transparency, and effective risk management. The legislative intent
to prioritize mitigation of risk by maintaining open lines of
communication between agencies supports mandatory § 7
consultations in light of adverse impacts on biodiversity.
The stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved."' 8  Interpreting the statutory
mandate to protect biodiversity, the Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill held that the value of species is incalculable, and as
such, Congress intended to preserve species and grant endangered
species the highest protection when it passed the ESA.99 The ESA
requires the FWS to make decisions based on the "best available
science and commercial data" rather than relying on the
inconclusiveness of data to make "mere conclusions."'w Section 7 of
the ESA requires the government to consult with the FWS before
taking any action that affects a protected species.'" The Secretary
must make listing decisions "solely on the basis of the best scientific
and commercial data available to him."'0 2 This standard suggests that
the ESA requires the U.S. government to take precaution and have
sufficient data before taking an action that would impact an
endangered or threatened species.'°3 Due to GMO's adverse effects
on biodiversity, under the ESA, the FWS has regulatory jurisdiction
over an agency's decision to deregulate any GMO.
97. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50856,
50857 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984); Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
99. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978).
100. N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 628 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
101. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
102. 16 USC §1533(b)(1)(A).
103. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 for consultations regarding government action.
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The House Report accompanying the ESA explains Congress's
intent to preserve genetic diversity:
From all the evidence available to us, it appears
that the pace of disappearance of species is
accelerating. As we homogenize the habitats in which
these plants and animals evolved, and as we increase
the pressure for products that they are in a position to
supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and
our own-genetic heritage.
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite
literally, incalculable.... If the blue whale, the largest
animal in the history of this world, were to disappear,
it would not be possible to replace it-it would simply
be gone. Irretrievably. Forever.
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is
in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses
of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are
potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which
we cannot solve, and may provide answers to
questions which we have not yet learned to ask.
Man can threaten the existence of species of
plants and animals in any of a number of ways, by
excessive use, by unrestricted trade, by pollution or by
other destruction of their habitat or range. The most
significant of those has proven to also be the most
difficult to control: the destruction of critical habitat."4
Congress intended the ESA to protect against precisely the kinds of
harms resulting from GMO deregulation: the habitat destruction of
pollinators by way of genetic contamination, increased use of
chemical treatments, and disruption of feeding. If the current
regulatory framework cannot enforce mandatory § 7 consultations,
then the Coordinated Framework structure should be amended to
include the FWS.
The federal regulatory system includes both an approach of
pristine-preservation and restoration, as well as a resource-based,
104. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 143-44 (1973).
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utilitarian approach to environmental protection, making such
regulation a difficult task.05 For example, the U.S. Forest Service
maintains and protects our forests, but also governs timber
extraction."°  The National Marine Fisheries Service conserves
marine resources, but must also provide for commercial 
fisheries.'9
The National Park Service has to preserve the natural and pristine
park environment, but also has to allow for human recreational
activity.'O' To deal with these dichotomous obligations, the
government has to take an integrative approach to ecosystem
management and sustainability of resources. Former Director of the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Jamie Rappaport Clark, noted:
Decisions to list a species as threatened or endangered
take into account not only population size, but also the
degree of threat, based on factors like disease, habitat
loss, and commercial use. We need to understand all
these factors if we are to make smart choices about
how to best conserve species and their habitats19
The FWS is no exception; this agency is responsible for analyzing
and responding to biodiversity threats, while taking into account
potentially conflicting commercial uses of resources. GMOs implicate
a wide variety of issues including resources, food security, intellectual
property, human health, and biodiversity. The FWS certainly has a
role to play in its regulation, whether through a § 7 consultation or
legislative amendment, such that the Coordinated Framework
includes the FWS.
Regulating the introduction of GMOs under the ESA should
remain solely under the purview of federal regulatory power. The
Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution and laws and treaties
made pursuant to it are the supreme law of the land, and that federal
law controls and invalidates state law if conflict arises between state
and federal law." ° Section 1535(f) of the ESA expressly preempts
state laws that are less restrictive than the ESA: "Any State law or
regulation respecting the taking of an endangered species or





110. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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threatened species may be more restrictive than the exemptions or
permits provided for in this [Act] or in any regulation which
implements this [Act] but not less restrictive than the prohibitions so
defined.'" Therefore, Congress expressly established a threshold
level of federal biodiversity protection by passing the ESA.
GMO introductions into the environment endanger pollinators
and as such could likely be considered a "regulation respecting the
taking of an endangered or threatened species." So strong is the
causal link between GMO introductions and ecosystem disruption
that any state law allowing such regulations without FWS
consultations falls short of the protection level established by
Congress in the ESA. Under the ESA, GMO introductions constitute
a taking of endangered pollinators, and in accordance with its powers
under the Supremacy Clause, Congress has expressly established that
the ESA provides the baseline level of endangered or threatened
species protection. Therefore, states cannot regulate the introduction
of GMOs into our environment as long as those regulations are so
permissive that they violate the conservation measures of the ESA.
VII. ESA Regulation of GMO Introductions Under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause
Under its constitutionally enumerated powers, the federal
government has the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.""2
Commerce includes all stages of business and Congress can regulate
any activity, including intrastate activity that has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate
commerce."3 Congress can regulate activities that individually have
little effect, but cumulatively have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.14 The Court defers to congressional assessments of an
activity's effect on interstate commerce as long as a rational basis
exists for doing so."' Notably, the Court in United States v. Lopez
concluded that the "substantial effect" on interstate commerce can be
measured by aggregating the effects of individual activities, but only if
111. National Audubon Society v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
California ban on the use of leghold traps was preempted by the ESA).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
113. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
114. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
115. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,304 (1964).
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those individual activities are themselves "economic" or
"commercial" in nature.116 In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court defined an
economic activity as an activity having to do with "production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.1 17 There, the Court
held that Congress can regulate intrastate, noncommercial activities
when doing so is necessary to the success of a broader, interstate
regulatory scheme.8
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a regulation is
permissible when it is an "essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.""9 Thus, determining
whether the commerce clause doctrine justifies congressional
regulation of an activity turns on whether the activity is economic: If
the activity is economic, Congress may aggregate the individual
effects of an activity to determine whether the overall impact results
in a substantial effect on interstate commerce (i.e., rational basis); if
the activity is noneconomic, Congress's findings on the effects of the
activity on interstate commerce receive deference if the activity is
part of a larger regulatory scheme.'20
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit upheld § 7 consultation requirements
of the ESA against a Commerce Clause challenge. In San Luis &
Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar, almond, pistachio, and
walnut farmers sued FWS for violating the Commerce Clause by
preventing completion of state water projects on behalf of
endangered delta smelt protection.21 In its biological opinion, the
FWS found that state water projects constituted a taking of
endangered delta smelt because such projects threatened the
continued existence of the species.12 Plaintiff-farmers claimed that
enforcing ESA consultation requirements for (as well as subsequent
protection of) delta smelt was unconstitutional because the delta
116. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555-56; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
117. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 24-25.
120. Id.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
121. San Luis v. Salazar, 638 F. 3d 1163,1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
122. Id. at 1167. The FWS issues a biological opinion following a consultation. The
biological opinion is a statement explaining how the government's proposed action will
affect an endangered or threatened species and suggests "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" to the agency action (if any exist) that will not violate the ESA. 16 U.S.C. §
1536(b)(3)(A). See also Conultations: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/faq.html.
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smelt is purely an intrastate species with no commercial value;
therefore, applying this requirement to the operation of California's
water distribution system was "an invalid exercise of constitutional
authority [under the Commerce Clause].'' 23 The court held that the
Commerce Clause challenge to § 7 of the ESA failed because species
protection "bears a substantial relation to commerce.
1 24
The court articulated several reasons why protecting threatened
or endangered species is an economic activity: Endangerment may be
a direct result of overexploitation of the species for commercial
purposes; the ESA serves to prevent interstate commerce of
protected species; the "ESA protects the future and unanticipated
interstate-commerce value of species," and recovery of an
endangered or threatened species may lead to a market for
commercial use of those species. Particularly relevant to this note,
the court stated that "It]he genetic diversity provided by endangered
or threatened species improves agriculture and aquaculture, which
clearly affect interstate commerce.',126 The court explained that the
only requirement to pass muster under the Commerce Clause "is that
'the comprehensive regulatory scheme' have a 'substantial relation to
commerce' and does not need to be a "purely economic or
commercial statute."'27
In a more recent case in Utah, the district court struck down
protection of the threatened Utah prairie dog because protection of a
purely intrastate species was not an economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce.' The court held that
"[a]lthough the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to do many
things, it does not authorize Congress to regulate takings of a purely
intrastate species that has no substantial effect on interstate
commerce."'2 9 The court specified that the substantial effect test is
concerned with the "regulated activity": "The question in the present
case is whether take of the Utah prairie dog has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, not whether the regulation preventing the
take has such an effect" and the Commerce Clause was not meant to
123. San Luis, 638 F. 3d at 1168.
124. Id. at 1174.
125. Id. at 1176.
126. Id.
127. Id. at1177.
128. People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
57 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014).
129. Id. at 1346.
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regulate ecosystems.'3° The court found that the prairie dog itself had
no substantial effect on interstate commerce and that the causal link
of prairie dog extinction and other species extinction was too
attenuated.3 ' The court concluded that protection of the prairie dog
was not necessary to the ESA's economic scheme because "takes of
Utah prairie dogs on non-federal land-even to the point of
extinction-would not substantially affect the national market for any
commodity regulated by the ESA."'32 Reasoning that Congress did
not have authority under the Commerce Clause or Necessary and
Proper Clause, the district court held that Congress did not have
authority to regulate takings of prairie dogs on non-federal land.'33
Unlike the attenuated effects of prairie dog extinction, the
substantial effect of pollinator endangerment on the entire
agricultural industry is unquestioned. Farmers have already
experienced severe declines in agricultural productivity due to the
growing disappearance of pollinators. The scientific community is
largely in agreement that loss of habitat and loss of natural forage
negatively impact bee population abundance and species distribution.
As discussed earlier, many studies and basic principles of biology
indicate that introduction of GMOs into the environment and
concomitant agricultural practices decrease habitat and forage upon
which various endangered and threatened species of bees depend.
These adverse effects of GMOs on pollinator biodiversity
substantially affect agriculture, an economic activity, by putting
almost seventy-five percent of our crops at risk (as pollinators are
responsible for the growth of nearly seventy-five percent of our
crops).4 The federal government has the power to regulate the
growth of GMOs under the Commerce Clause and should do so
under the Necessary and Proper Clause as protecting endangered
pollinators is necessary for the overall regulatory scheme of the ESA
(i.e., protecting endangered species). The ESA regulatory scheme
"has a substantial relation to commerce" since protecting pollination
dynamics is necessary for the nation's commercial agricultural
industry. Thus, the constitutionally enumerated powers granted to
130. Id. at 1344.
131. Id. at 1344-45.
132. Id. at 1346.
133. Id. at 1345-46.
134. Pollinators, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/ pollinators/
Index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
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Congress justify and necessitate more demanding restrictions on the
use of GMOs.
Conclusion
Scientific studies show that GMOs have an adverse impact on
biodiversity. Despite the GMO industry defense that GMOs benefit
the environment by reducing the need for pesticides and herbicides,
studies show that the use of these and other toxic chemicals has
actually increased with the introduction of GMOs into our
agricultural system.' Pest and weed resistance results from these
GMO industry practices, and this threatens food resources and
habitat for pollinators. When a government action threatens the
survival of a species, the government must consult with the FWS
before carrying out the action. Deregulating GMOs threatens the
survival of pollinators; therefore, the EPA and USDA must consult
with the FWS before approving GMO deregulations.
135. Benbrook, supra note 17.
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